[:sv]MeraKrypto i Göteborg och Malmö[:]

[:sv]oej (Olle E. Johansson) fortsätter att dra i MeraKrypto. Nu har han
överträffat sig själv och fått ihop två event i december!

Gå på det här om ni har chansen. Info från oej:

Vi kör #meraKrypto i Göteborg den 1 december och i Malmö den 8 december.

Programmet för Göteborg finns här:
http://www.meetup.com/MeraKrypto-Goteborg/events/226723218/

Lyssna på mig, Jakob Schlyter och Per-Erik Eriksson och få en rejäl
injektion av TLS och krypto!
Ta kontakt med Per-Erik om du vill vara med och prata på kommande
event i Göteborg.

Programmet för Malmö kommer snart. Vi kommer att vara på Foo Café på
kvällen den 8 december.

Boka i era almanackor nu och anmäl er på webben så fort det kommer upp.

[:]


[:en]Lots of TLS and HTTPS during #merakrypto[:sv]Mycket TLS och HTTPS under #merakrypto[:]

[:en]This post is a summary of the #merakrypto event, written in Swedish.[:sv]Under kvällen igår gick det tredje #merakrypto-mötet av stapeln hos .SE. Denna gång hölls två föreläsningar: organisatören Olle E. Johansson höll en introduktion till samt uppdatering av det aktuella läget för kryptering på nätet, och John Mattsson från Ericsson en djupare föreläsning om prestanda för HTTPS. Det var en intressant och rolig tillställning där de 30-40 deltagarna var väldigt aktiva med frågor och kommentarer.

Nästa #merakrypto hålls den 2:a juni hos Upsys i Uppsala. Konceptet #merakrypto håller dessutom på att sprida sig till Göteborg och Malmö — håll ögonen öppna var du än befinner dig i landet![:]


Answer to the UN about crypto and human rightsSvar till FN om kryptering och mänskliga rättigheter

Below you’ll find DFRI:s submission to the United Nations (UN) request for information in preparation for an upcoming report on the legal frameworks governing cryptography, anonymity and its relationship to human rights. This report will be presented to the Human Rights Council in June, 2015.


Dear Sir,
This letter is a response from DFRI (Föreningen för digitala fri- och rättigheter, a non-profit Swedish civil society organization working on digital rights), to your request for views with regards to encryption and how it relates to fundamental human rights. While strong
cryptography is a requirement for commercial activities, this is not what DFRI or this letter focuses on.

DFRI provides strong anonymous Internet access by being one of the largest Tor (an encrypted anonymization network) operators. This access is provided for two major reasons; to better protect the end users communication from mass surveillance and to help end users in totalitarian states to circumvent censorship.

The right to use cryptography and to be anonymous is a fundamental requirement for democracy, as freedom of speech cannot be guaranteed if there is a constant fear of repercussions. It is furthermore a requirement for the continued existences of investigative journalism due to the fact that whistleblowing often have weak legal protection.

DFRI spends a significant amount of resources to educate end users on how to encrypt their traffic. Our experience from this has taught us that end users encrypt and anonymize their traffic for many reasons. Here are but a few;

  • Journalists use it to perform their jobs without revealing who their sources are
  • Domestic abuse victims use it to hide from their aggressors
  • People suffering from medical conditions use it to learn more of their ailments
  • Members of the labor force use it in communications with their unions
  • Law enforcement uses it to investigate suspected criminals
  • DFRI also helps activists in other countries with the investigation of censorship technologies and their deployment. This would not be possible without strong encryption and anonymity, as activists sometimes take great personal risks in aiding with these investigations.

We would also like to add that being a provider of anonymous Internet services does not result in a large amount of abuse cases. Indeed, DFRI has a level of abuse that per Mbit/s is lower or comparable to non-anonymized Internet services.

On behalf of DFRI
Andreas JonssonNedan följer det svar DFRI har skickat in till Förenta Nationerna (FN) angående deras informationsförfrågan inför en rapport de jobbar med om de legala ramverk som gäller kryptering och anonymitet i relation till mänskliga rättigheter. Rapporten ska presenteras i FN:s råd för mänskliga rättigheter i juni 2015.


Dear Sir,
This letter is a response from DFRI (Föreningen för digitala fri- och rättigheter, a non-profit Swedish civil society organization working on digital rights), to your request for views with regards to encryption and how it relates to fundamental human rights. While strong
cryptography is a requirement for commercial activities, this is not what DFRI or this letter focuses on.

DFRI provides strong anonymous Internet access by being one of the largest Tor (an encrypted anonymization network) operators. This access is provided for two major reasons; to better protect the end users communication from mass surveillance and to help end users in totalitarian states to circumvent censorship.

The right to use cryptography and to be anonymous is a fundamental requirement for democracy, as freedom of speech cannot be guaranteed if there is a constant fear of repercussions. It is furthermore a requirement for the continued existences of investigative journalism due to the fact that whistleblowing often have weak legal protection.

DFRI spends a significant amount of resources to educate end users on how to encrypt their traffic. Our experience from this has taught us that end users encrypt and anonymize their traffic for many reasons. Here are but a few;

  • Journalists use it to perform their jobs without revealing who their sources are
  • Domestic abuse victims use it to hide from their aggressors
  • People suffering from medical conditions use it to learn more of their ailments
  • Members of the labor force use it in communications with their unions
  • Law enforcement uses it to investigate suspected criminals
  • DFRI also helps activists in other countries with the investigation of censorship technologies and their deployment. This would not be possible without strong encryption and anonymity, as activists sometimes take great personal risks in aiding with these investigations.

We would also like to add that being a provider of anonymous Internet services does not result in a large amount of abuse cases. Indeed, DFRI has a level of abuse that per Mbit/s is lower or comparable to non-anonymized Internet services.

On behalf of DFRI
Andreas Jonsson